The Conception of Popularity in the Enlightenment and Romanticism by Oesterle, Günter
By choosing to view the constellation of the Enlightenment and Romanticism 
exclusively as a binary opposition, the range of each term is narrowed down con-
siderably, while the complex relationship between continuity and discontinuity 
is reduced. Conversely, by underexposing the difference between the Enlighten-
ment and Romanticism, one important finding can be easily overlooked: the in-
sight into the selectivity of a paradigm shift around 1800.
However, the following consideration may help to elude this predicament be-
tween either narrowing down the focus by overstressing the differences between 
the Enlightenment and Romanticism or diluting them by underexposure: In 
conjunction with the call for independent thought and autonomy, Romanti-
cism can be seen as the sometimes problematic attempt at a second, more radical 
Enlightenment. From such a perspective, Romanticism addresses the immanent 
contradictions, exclusions and dogmas of the first Enlightenment and tries to 
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it can hardly be disputed that the theme of popularity is central to the enlightenment. 
popularity is the sociality equivalent to the individual appeal: ‘dare to know.’ parallel to 
this runs the following imperative: ‘dare to encourage your neighbour and your fellow 
man and woman to think on their own – even though they do not belong to the erudite 
elite.’ it is also undeniable that romantic authors and philosophers polemically attempt-
ed to tear down the popularity project of the enlightenment, their main criticism being 
its tendency towards mediocrity. it is less well known that romantic authors and philoso-
phers themselves, around the turn of the nineteenth century, made popularity their cen-
tral concern. to quote Friedrich schlegel in the journal Athenaeum: ‘the time of popularity 
has come.’ this article explores the romantics’ alternative conception of popularity, with 
especial reference to Johann gottlieb Fichte and the grimm brothers. to this end, it is 
helpful to reconstruct the background of the romantic attempt to create an independent 
concept of popularity: the debate between immanuel kant and the german popular  
philosopher christian garve on the necessity, possibilities, and limits of popularity.
.  .  .  .  .  .  .  .  .
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deconstruct them or at least to expand and complete them, thereby naturally 
creating its own new dogmas, contradictions, and exclusions. 
Such a view of the constellation of the Enlightenment and Romanticism dis-
tances itself from the traditional hermeneutic-harmonic model of a ‘dialogue 
of the ages’ which merely deals with questions and responses. Instead, it pays at 
least equal attention to the destructive, polemic energies of knowledge. Not only 
did Romantic authors and philosophers address the questions which had been 
left unanswered by the Enlightenment and suggest their own solutions, they also 
positively zeroed in on the aporias, exclusions, and taboos of the Enlightenment. 
They were determined to go beyond the boundaries of that era in order to con-
tinue the Enlightenment in a highly idiosyncratic manner. Such a perspective 
on two different forms of Enlightenment with their respective achievements and 
aporias enables the modern reader to create historical distance and precision. The 
problem of popularity provides a case in point of the Romantic tendency to con-
tinue, through deconstruction, the Enlightenment.
It can hardly be disputed that popularity is one of the central themes of the 
Enlightenment. Popularity is the ‘sociality’ equivalent to the individual appeal: 
‘Habe Mut, dich deines eigenen Verstandes zu bedienen’ [dare to know] – and it goes 
as follows: Dare to encourage your neighbour, colleague and your fellow man 
and woman to think on their own.1 Through this collective appeal, the tenet of 
the Enlightenment – that man has a universal capacity for rational thought – is 
put to practical use. It is the call for everyone to engage in universal and public 
reasoning about the affairs of human society. Everyone, even if they lack expert 
knowledge or have not undertaken prolonged studies; everyone regardless of so-
cial status or class, as long as they are eager to learn, unafraid to think, given to 
observation and open to new experiences and to sharing them with others.2 The 
Enlightenment’s conception of popularity is a universal concept with utopian 
tendencies.
It is equally undisputed that the Romantic authors and philosophers tried 
polemically to deconstruct this conception of popularity preferably with regard 
to its specification in popular philosophy. It is those authors and philosophers 
this article will focus on. They mainly reproach the Enlightenment’s conception 
of popularity with having a tendency to foster mediocrity. To quote Friedrich 
Schlegel: ‘Der Ahriman des Zeitalters ist die Mediokrität; Garve und Nicolai dürften es bis 
zur Religion dahin gebracht haben. Voß und Wieland für Poesie. Matthison in der Nullität’ 
[The Ahriman of that age is mediocrity; Garve and Nicolai have arguably made it 
their religion. Voß and Wieland did the same for poetry. Matthison in nullity].3
Among other things, the shrill polemics against the conception of popular-
ity within popular philosophy has led to both non-academics and academics 
labelling Romanticism as elitist, avant-garde, exotic and sinister rather than as 
popular. This view is exemplified by the last statement of an article on popular 
philosophy in the Lexikon der Aufklärung [Encyclopaedia of the Enlightenment]. 
It says: Popular philosophy ‘wurde sehr bald von J. G. Fichte, der einen “neuen vorneh-
men Ton” in die Philosophie einführte und seinen Schülern überholt’ [was soon made 
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obsolete by J. G. Fichte and his disciples who introduced a ‘new refined tone’ into 
philosophy].4 According to this summary, philosophy ‘wurde wieder einmal elitär 
und antipopulär’ [once again became elitist and anti-popular].5 In contrast to this 
prejudice, Friedrich Schlegel formulates the following programmatic thought in 
the magazine Athenaeum published by himself and his brother in 1799: ‘die Zeit 
der Popularität ist gekommen’ [the time of popularity has come].6 Correspondingly, 
he states in the 1803 edition of his magazine Europa that the philosopher Fichte 
was ‘gegenwärtig am meisten’ [currently most] interested ‘für die literarische Form’ 
[in literary form] and hence in popularity.7 In Athenaeum, F. Schlegel had already 
presented Fichte as an important role model for popular philosophical writing. 
Having declared his intention ‘die Schriften des berühmten Kant, der so oft über die 
Unvollkommenheit seiner Darstellung klagt, durch Umschrift verständlich zu machen’ [to 
rewrite the texts of the famous Kant, who himself often deplores the imperfec-
tion of his descriptions, in order to make them more intelligible],8 he goes on to 
write in his essay ‘Über Philosophie’ [On Philosophy]:
Bei Fichte wäre ein solches Verfahren sehr überflüssig. Noch nie sind die Resultate der tiefsten und 
wie ins Unendliche fortgesetzten Reflexion mit der Popularität und Klarheit ausgedrückt [worden]. 
. . . Es ist mir interessant, dass ein Denker, dessen einziges großes Ziel die Wissenschaftlichkeit der 
Philosophie ist, und der das künstliche Denken vielleicht mehr in seiner Gewalt hat, als irgendeiner 
seiner Vorgänger, doch auch für die allgemeinste Mitteilung so begeistert sein kann. Ich halte diese 
Popularität für eine Annäherung der Philosophie zur Humanität im wahren und großen Sinne des 
Worts, wo es erinnert, dass der Mensch nur unter Menschen leben, und so weit sein Geist auch um 
sich greift, am Ende doch dahin wieder heimkehren soll. Er hat auch hierin seinen Willen mit eiserner 
Kraft durchgesetzt, und seine neuesten Schriften sind freundschaftliche Gespräche mit dem Leser, in 
dem treuherzigen, schlichten Style eines Luther’ 
[Such a procedure would be highly unnecessary with regard to Fichte’s work. Never 
before have the results of the most profound and virtually infinite reflection been expressed 
with such popularity and clarity. . . . I find it intriguing that a thinker whose sole major pur-
pose is the scientific nature of philosophy and whose mastery of abstract thinking probably 
surpasses that of all of his predecessors can nevertheless find enthusiasm for the most 
common of messages. I consider this popularity to be philosophy’s approach to humanity 
in the truest sense of the word – reminding us that man can only live among men and that 
eventually, he will always return home to their company, regardless of how far his mind 
may reach. He [Fichte] has been adamant to make his point in this regard as well, and his 
latest texts are friendly conversations with the reader in the trusting, plain style of Luther.]9
It seems obvious: During Romanticism, popularity is at least as emotionally 
charged and imperative as it was during the Enlightenment.10 Friedrich Schlegel 
writes: ‘[I]st es die Bestimmung des Autors, die Poesie und die Philosophie unter die Men-
schen zu verbreiten und für’s Leben und aus dem Leben zu bilden: so ist Popularität seine 
erste Pflicht und sein höchstes Ziel’ [If it is the author’s vocation to create poetry and 
philosophy from life and with life in mind and to spread them among his fellow 
men: then popularity is his first duty and his highest aim].11 
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However, Romanticism only deserves to be called an attempt at a second En-
lightenment if it manages the Herculean task of popularising an esoteric, avant-
gardiste, non-empirical way of thinking and writing as a more radical, autono-
mous way of thinking.
Thus, the structure of this article can be outlined as follows:
1. Sketching out the universal concept of popularity as conceived by popular philoso-
phy – predominantly with regard to the explosiveness of the controversial discussion 
between Garve and Kant about the limits of popularity within philosophy.
2. Reconstructing the relentless, polemical way in which this concept of popularity was 
analysed by the Romantic authors and philosophers – and to extrapolate their Ro-
mantic alternative.
t h e  U n i v e r s a l  c o n c e p t  o f  
p o p u l a r  p h i l o s o p h y  a n d  i t s  L i m i t s
Even in its specific form within popular philosophy, the concept of popularity 
during the Enlightenment is a universal one. This means that it has become ef-
fective and left its mark ‘in jedem auch noch so untergeordneten Kreise des Lebens’ [in 
every sphere of life, no matter how subordinate],12 in communication, in the cir-
culation of knowledge, in the habitus, in the style of thinking, writing, and living. 
The first and accentuating achievement of popular philosophy was to liberate the 
arts and philosophy from the ghetto of a business run by specialists and experts 
as it had been established by scholarly philosophy. Consequently, this led to the 
focus being shifted from logic epistemology and metaphysics to moral philoso-
phy, psychology, anthropology, and new aesthetics, i.e. to empirical sciences and 
worldly philosophy. Secondly, popular philosophy makes experiences accessible 
by creating methods for observation. Its lasting socio-political merit is to have 
cultivated the art of assuming multiple viewpoints and multiple perspectives in 
conversations, essays, and historiographical writing. Its specific achievement is 
the invention of the high art of reasoning, i.e. of turning and weighing different 
arguments this way and that, and of having them scrutinised by many parties. A 
new habitus, new media (inter alia journals), new ways and formats of presenta-
tion and new mediators as well as a tone of writing and speaking (the so-called 
conversational tone) which until then had only been reserved for the elite – they 
all came to serve as a role model and tended to become part of common knowl-
edge. When a new scholarly discipline, aesthetics, emerged around the middle 
of the 18th century, scholars started to be criticised as pedantic.13 They were no 
longer supposed to educate themselves as specialists, but rather to practise ways 
of elegant and open communication. Parallel to economic theories, urban ways 
of life were created in order to link and practise the circulation of knowledge and 
the know-how of certain ways of speaking and writing. Ramdohr demands: ‘[D]ie 
Gelehrten, die schönen Geister und die Künstler müssen Vereinigung-Punkte haben, wo sie 
. . . besonders mit Welt- und Hofleuten zusammenkommen, und dabei laut sprechen und 
40






























glänzen können. Von dort aus geht dann der Stoff an Hof und Stadt, wird durchgeknetet 
und zur Speise für jedermann zubereitet’ [Scholars, poets and artists need to have 
a common ground where they . . . can convene first and foremost with cosmo-
politans and courtiers, and where they can speak freely and scintillate with their 
wit. From there, the subject matters of their discussions reach the court and the 
city, where they are kneaded and turned into a palatable meal for everybody].14 
Such social gathering points existed in a plethora of variations. They ranged 
from municipal reading societies to the reading circles of rural nobility and ex-
changed their ideas via popular science journals (mostly emerging in the wake of 
English morality weeklies) which had a similar aim of changing general habits. 
‘Fictitious’ authorship provided creative freedom including ‘letters’, ‘dreams’ and 
‘anecdotes’ and thus presented the programme of a happy union of entertain-
ment and education.15 Gottfried August Bürger claims that ‘alle Poesie soll volksmäßig 
sein’16 [all kinds of poetic work ought to be popular], that is ‘den mehrsten aus al-
len Klassen anschaulich und behaglich’ [intelligible and pleasing to the majority of 
every class].17 This is achieved when ‘sogleich alles unverschleiert, blank und bar, ohne 
Verwirrung, in das Auge der Phantasie springe’ [everything immediately catches the 
reader’s imagination in an unvarnished, bare, simple and unconfused fashion].18 
‘Popular philosophy’ during the age of Enlightenment deepens and broadens 
these ambitions by reflecting on the feasibility of a ‘Lebhaftigkeit der Darstellung’ 
[vividness of depiction], i.e. a pointed way of writing under a salient perspective 
or a ‘Unterscheidung zwischen Dialog und Erzählung’ [distinction between dialogue 
and narration].19 In his Logik, Immanuel Kant states that ‘[e]in populärer Vortrag 
verlangt über die logisch-begriffliche Deutlichkeit hinaus lebendige Bilder, Beispiele in con-
creto und also ästhetische Deutlichkeit’ [on top of logical and terminological clarity, a 
popular disquisition needs vivid images, concrete examples and hence aesthetic 
clarity].20 The thesis ‘Popularität solle nicht sowohl die Gegenstände bezeichnen, welche 
man behandelt, als die Art und Weise wie man sie behandelt’ [popularity ought not to 
refer to the objects treated, but rather to the way in which they are treated] aims 
at the standard of an educated, common language.21 In this context, it is hard to 
overstate the importance of the fact that the German popular philosophers often 
looked across the borders towards England and France.
During the Enlightenment, popular philosophy gained greater currency 
thanks to the discussion between Christian Garve and Immanuel Kant about 
the limits of popularity within philosophy. This discussion turns the Enlight-
enment into an experimental playground. In July and August 1783, it reaches a 
high-watermark in two letters exchanged between the rivals. Ten years later – in 
1793 – it obtains its final form in Garve’s balanced reasoning in his essay Von der 
Popularität des Vortrags [On the popularity of the disquisition]. Garve and Kant’s 
two letters demonstrate what has already been stated earlier in this article (on 
an intermediate level of abstraction) about the achievement of popular philoso-
phy: First of all, it is noteworthy that the two scholars and authors held each 
other in high regard (the letter exchange was occasioned by a slating public re-
view of Kritik der reinen Vernunft [Critique of Pure Reason] and Kant’s call for the 
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anonymous critic to reveal himself to the public). This makes the importance of 
transparency and clarity within their argumentation understandable. However, 
one particularly admirable aspect of those letters is the authors’ circumspect ap-
proach and their willingness to qualify their own judgements. ‘Aber das ist auch 
jetzt noch meine Meynung vielleicht eine irrige’ [However, this is my opinion and it 
may be mistaken], Garve writes before going on to formulate his imperative of 
the universality of popularity.22 What makes those two letters genuine gems is 
the formidable sincerity with which the two scholars make references to the state 
they are in at the time of writing, up to and including the situation in which they 
are writing (e.g. while on a journey). Garve confesses his reluctance with regard 
to the cumbersome and unintelligible nature of Kant’s text:
Ich will das nicht ganz von mir ableugnen . . . dass [ich] über den Schwierigkeiten . . . unwillig gewor-
den sei. Ich gestehe, ich bin es zuweilen geworden; weil ich glaubte, es müsse möglich sein, Wahrheiten, 
die wichtige Reformen in der Philosophie hervorbringen sollen, denen welche des Nachdenkens nicht 
ganz ungewohnt sind, leichter verständlich zu machen 
[I cannot completely deny . . . that the difficulties made [me] reluctant. I have to admit 
that sometimes this was the case; because I believed that it had to be possible for truths 
aimed at reforming philosophy to be made more intelligible for those not entirely unac-
customed to reflection.]23
And Kant? He is the paragon of commitment: In his turn, he responds to those 
‘in ihrem geehrten Schreiben deutliche Beweise einer pünktlichen und gewissen-
haften Redlichkeit und einer menschlichen teilnehmenden Denkungsart’ [clear 
proofs of a punctual and conscientious integrity and a human, compassionate 
way of thinking in your revered letter]24 with a confession providing insight into 
his life story as a scholar.
Auch gestehe ich frei, dass ich auf eine geschwinde günstige Aufnahme meiner Schrift gleich zu An-
fangs nicht gerechnet habe; denn zu diesem Zwecke war der Vortrag der Materien, die ich mehr als 
zwölf Jahre hintereinander sorgfältig durchgedacht hatte, nicht der allgemeinen Fasslichkeit gezwun-
gen angemessen ausgearbeitet worden, als wozu noch einige Jahre erforderlich gewesen wären, da 
ich hingegen in etwa vier bis fünf Monate zu Stande brachte, aus Furcht, ein so weitläufiges Geschäft 
würde mir, bei längerer Zögerung, endlich selber zur Last werden und meine zunehmenden Jahre (da 
ich jetzt schon im sechzigsten bin) möchten es mir, der ich jetzt noch das ganze System im Kopf habe, 
zuletzt vielleicht unmöglich machen 
[I must also freely confess that I had not expected my text to be quickly and well 
received initially; since the disquisition of the subject matters which I had given careful 
thought to for more than twelve years had not been composed so that it could be com-
monly understood – a task which would have required several additional years; instead I 
completed it in just four to five months, fearing that such a comprehensive endeavour 
would eventually become a burden if I hesitated too long, and that my increasing age (see-
ing as I am already 60 years old) may eventually prevent me from writing down the entire 
system which as of now is still fresh in my mind].25
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Embedded in this mutual tone of considerate conversation, there is nevertheless 
Garve’s unequivocal and plain call ‘dass das Ganze Ihres Systems, wenn es wirklich 
brauchbar werden soll, populärer ausgedrückt werden müsse, und es Wahrheit enthält, 
auch ausgedrückt werden könne; und dass die neue Sprache, welche durchaus in demselben 
herrscht, so großen Scharfsinn auch der Zusammenhang verrät, in welchen die Ausdrücke 
derselben gebracht worden, doch oft die in der Wissenschaft selbst vorgenommenen Reform 
oder die Abweichung von den Gedanken anderer, noch größer erscheinen machen als sie 
wirklich sind’ [for the entirety of your system to be expressed in a more popular 
manner, should it really be put to use – which ought to be possible as long as it 
contains truth; and that the new language of this system, however perspicacious 
the context in which its terms are used, often makes the scholarly reform or the 
idiosyncrasy of the expressed ideas appear larger than they actually are].26
In his multi-tiered reply, Kant first acknowledges the legitimacy of a call for 
popularity although he deems it to be absolutely unobtainable when it comes to 
unfolding the principles of epistemology.27 Secondly, Kant asks for the creators 
of an entirely new system (which cannot avoid introducing new terminology) to 
be given licence to initially present the system ‘als Ganzes’ [as a whole] ‘in einer 
gewissen Rohigkeit’ [in a somewhat rough state] ‘eine Zeitlang’ [for a certain time]. 
He hopes that the author himself may afterwards ‘explain’ and popularise his 
work piece by piece, in detail and with the help of others (through a ‘vereinte 
Bemühung’ [common effort]) so that the ‘erste Betäubung’ [initial stunning effect] 
‘[die] eine Menge ganz ungewohnter Begriffe und einer noch ungewöhnlicheren Sprache, 
hervorbringen musste . . . verlieren wird’ [engendered by a plethora of quite unfamil-
iar terms and an even more unfamiliar language . . . will subside] (an argument 
Friedrich Schlegel would return to in his essay ‘Über Unverständlichkeit’ [On 
unintelligibility]).28
Despite his confidence that popularity will gain ground in difficult areas of 
philosophy, Kant, having weighed all options, still remains sceptical with regard 
to the attention level of the ‘geschmackvolleren Publikums’ [more tasteful audi-
ence].29 
According to him, the ‘herrschende Geschmack dieses Zeitalters’ [prevailing taste 
of the age] does not really support such an endeavour: ‘[D]as Schwere in specula-
tiven Dingen als leicht vorzustellen (nicht leicht zu machen)’ [to present the difficult 
nature of speculative matters in a simple way (not to simplify them)].30
In hindsight, it can be said that in his reasoning and considerations regard-
ing both the necessity and the virtually insurmountable difficulty of achieving a 
truly ‘popular’ philosophy, Kant does offer many new points of departure. The 
authors and philosophers of Romanticism endorse Kant’s Zeitgeist diagnosis that 
an increasing general power of judgement in the area of empirical knowledge has 
resulted in the already low number of people interested in speculative thought 
becoming even lower. In his essay on Forster, Friedrich Schlegel returns to Kant’s 
sceptical statement that ‘eigentliche Philosophie’ [philosophy proper] ‘nicht für je-
dermann sei’ [is not for everybody].31 And yet, in the middle of the contemporary 
‘Sandwüste’ [sand desert] of speculative thought, the Romantic philosophers set 
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themselves the Herculean task of presenting the difficult nature of speculative 
matters in a simple manner (as opposed to simplifying them).32 For his part, the 
popular philosopher Garve revisits the difference between the genesis and the en-
suing validity of a new system of thought, an aspect of creative theory Kant had 
addressed in his response letter. In his essay Von der Popularität des Vortrags [On the 
popularity of the disquisition] (1793), Garve reflects on exceptions from popular-
ity and the ensuing efforts of reintegration necessary for his universal call for 
popularity to be eventually met. His argumentation is as follows: An inventor 
cannot be popular since he is forced to assume his own, highly individual point 
of view that goes against the grain of established knowledge. Rather, he needs 
to position himself outside the box of ‘common sense’ in order to arrive at ‘un-
gewöhnliche Folgerungen und Ideenverknüpfungen’33 [extraordinary conclusions and 
connections of thought]. Only if this invention has been ‘getrennt’ [separated] 
‘von der bloß subjectiven Form des ersten Erfinders’ [from the merely subjective form 
it had been given by the original inventor], ‘gesäubert’ [cleaned] and ‘abgeschliffen’ 
[polished], i.e. once it has been de-individualised and made ‘objektiv’ [objective] 
afterwards in a common effort, this invention can be presented in a popular way 
‘zu größerer Brauchbarkeit’ [with more practicality] and more ‘Geschmeidigkeit’ [el-
egance].34
c r i t i c i s m  o f  t h e  c o n c e p t i o n  o f  p o p u l a r i t y  
d u r i n g  t h e  L a t e  e n l i g h t e n m e n t  a n d  t h e  
p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  a  r o m a n t i c  A l t e r n a t i v e
This separation of genesis and validity, of the ‘dark workshop of thinking’ and 
the polished result, of professional work and presentation, provokes the Roman-
tics’ critical and polemic energy. To the Romantic authors, such a dissociation 
of innovation and popularisation (‘Wenn der Geist der Innovation aufhört, kann die 
Popularisierung beginnen’ [popularisation begins where the spirit of innovation 
ends]) bears witness to how the high good of popularity is degraded to a mere in-
strument, a vehicle and a rhetorical veil.35 For them, ‘das allmähliche Verfertigen des 
Gedankens’ [the gradual development of thought] – i.e. genetic speaking and writ-
ing becomes one of the possible roads to popularity. In terms of creative theory, 
Garve concedes that innovation can only be obtained if we ‘unserer Eigenheit mehr 
nachgebe[n] und daher sich um das Publikum wenig kümmer[n]. Die Denkkraft wird ge-
schwächt, wenn ihr Zwang angetan wird: und unsere Bemühungen unsere Gedanken deut-
lich zu machen, ist eine Art Zwang’ [give more room to our individuality and in turn 
care little about the audience. Coercion only weakens the power of thought: and 
our efforts to clarify our thoughts are a kind of coercion]. It is this concession 
that the Romantic authors pounce upon in a bid to solve the predicament of in-
novation and popularity. In his essay on Lessing, Friedrich Schlegel suggests that 
all ‘Interesse der öffentlichen Mitteilung’ [interest in informing the public] should be 
abandoned (since it in any case merely fuels the vanity of authors) in exclusive 
favour of the study of the matter itself, irrespective of public interest.36 In doing 
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so, i.e. by capturing the matter in a most individual manner, the author may in 
turn captivate his potential recipient. Certain styles of writing lend themselves 
particularly well to such reciprocal inspiration– for example the essay: ‘Der Essay 
ist ein wechselseitiger Galvanismus des Autors und des Lesers und auch ein innerer für jeden 
allein; systematischer Wechsel zwischen Lähmung und Zuckung. – Er soll Motion machen, 
gegen die geistige Gicht ankämpfen, die Agilität befördern’ [The essay is a reciprocal gal-
vanism between the author and the reader, as well as an inner galvanism for every 
person on their own; a systematic change between paralysis and twitching. – It is 
meant to cause motion, to battle ossification of the mind, to encourage agility].37 
As a consequence, Friedrich Schlegel diagnoses a ‘Tendenz unseres Zeitalters, alle 
Wissenschaften zu essayiren’ [tendency of our age to cast all scholarly thought into 
essays].38
In his essay on Forster, Friedrich Schlegel revisits Kant’s sceptical observa-
tion that the popularisation of speculative systems of thought was difficult at 
the time, and proceeds to apply it to the fine arts. Simultaneously, Schlegel gives 
a positive and productive spin to the power of popularity in terms of fine arts 
and speculative philosophy, which he regards as the result of division of labour. 
From this position, he presents Georg Forster as an example of what a decidedly 
‘social’ popular author may look like. Schlegel contends that, unlike the microl-
ogy of popular philosophy (which Schleiermacher characterises or rather mocks 
as ‘Anmerkungsphilosophie’ [annotative philosophy])39 Forster’s work is marked by 
the far-sighted and globally-oriented author’s ability to find concrete terms for 
experience and vision, entity and detail, urbanity, and virtue. Thus, Friedrich 
Schlegel has valid and forward-looking legal reasons40 to note: ‘Die Popularität 
[ist] ganz eigentlich Prinzip der Autorschaft’ [In essence, popularity is the principle 
of authorship].41
Academics have asserted the importance of Fichte’s disquisitions on the 
Bestimmung des Gelehrten [Vocation of the scholar] for Schlegel’s concept of a ‘ge-
sellschaftlichen Schriftstellers’ [social author].42 It is hard to overstate the importance 
of Fichte’s contribution to the conceptualisation of Romantic popularity. For 
Fichte has removed the pitfalls of the asymmetrical communication structure 
usually inherent in popularity, with its linear top-down transfer from the expert 
to the layman.43 He did so by liberating the listeners and readers from their sub-
ordinate position and ‘constructing’ them as future, forward-looking recipients 
on an equal footing with the author.
Fichte’s disquisition ‘Über die Bestimmung des Gelehrten’ caught the imagi-
nation of his contemporary readers and listeners. It was ground-breaking and 
formative since it transmuted what had hitherto been conceived of as static 
knowledge into dynamic knowledge transformation capable of producing new, 
future-oriented ideas.44 The scholar is presented as a leading role-model in soci-
ety. His analytical diagnosis of the present enables him to design action-changing 
options with a view to the future, instead of merely accumulating knowledge or 
at best re-organising it and putting it into perspective (Fichte speaks of ‘Eingreifen 
gewaltig ins Rad der Zeit’ [changing the course of history]).45 According to Fichte, 
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scholars ought to create and ‘construct’ new and forward-looking thoughts ‘ge-
netically’ from the inner ‘Wurzel seines Lebens’46 [root of their lives]. Since these 
ideas are entirely new and futuristic, they cannot possibly be accounted for by 
experience and observed accordingly;47 it takes an equally new, visionary listener 
and reader which the author Fichte constructs ‘a priori’ – and a style which (re-
gardless of all effort) essentially cannot be created willingly and intentionally. 
Fichte provides an elaborate description of how realisation ‘in den von ihr ergrif-
fenen und als Eigentum besessenen Menschen . . . hervorbricht’ [wells up in the indi-
viduals it captures and possesses].48 This is the source of the Romantic concept 
of popularity, the ‘point’ at which, in Fichte’s words, ‘der Gelehrte übergeht in den 
freien Künstler’ [the scholar becomes a liberal artist], ‘[der] Punkt der Vollendung des 
Gelehrten’49 [the point of the scholar’s completion]. He continues:
Wenn der Philosoph eine Idee in allen ihren einzelnen Bestandteilen Schritt für Schritt zerlegt . . . so 
geht er den Weg der methodischen Mitteilung. . . . Gelingt es ihm nun etwa noch zum Beschlusse das 
Ganze in seiner absoluten Einheit in einen einzigen Lichtstrahl zu fassen, der es wie ein Blitz durch-
leuchte und abgesondert hinstelle, und jeden verständigen Hörer oder Leser ergreife, dass er ausrufen 
müsse: ja, wahrhaftig, so ist es, jetzt sehe ich es mit einem Male ein: so ist dies die Darstellung der 
aufgegebenen Idee in ihrer unmittelbaren Anschaulichkeit, oder die Darstellung desselben durch den 
Witz: und hier zwar durch den direkten, oder positiven Witz [By dissecting an idea step by step, 
the philosopher follows the path of methodical information. . . . If then, upon conclud-
ing his work, he succeeds in capturing that idea in its absolute entity as in a single ray of 
light, illuminating it like lightning, setting it apart and moving every intelligent listener 
and reader to cry out: yes indeed, this is it, now it all makes sense: then, this idea has been 
presented in its immediate clarity, or through wit: that is, through direct or positive wit].50
This is not a description of simple intuition. Only at the conclusion of a complex 
methodical, incremental deduction can the licence and the commandment of an 
evidential image be formulated. It is the aim of every Romantic call for populari-
ty to create such evidential images – in philosophy, in polemics and in poetry par-
ticularly in the genres of the song, the fairy tale and the saga. With its reflections 
on the ‘An- und Umbilden’ [imagination and re-imagination] of existing texts, the 
conception of a ‘New Mythology’ seeks to create novel, impressive images from 
traditional myths and legendary topics.51 Clemens Brentano’s Loreley is a success-
ful, popular attempt to relocate the Siren myth from Greek mythology to the 
Rhine legend. By the same token, the Brothers Grimm’s concept of popularity 
also makes use of evidential images. Obviously, unlike Fichte’s, these images do 
not spring from high pathos, but rather from their closeness to the ‘simplicitas ma-
jestatis’ usually reserved for biblical texts. From this perspective, the poetic fairy 
tale is self-evident, necessary, its existence uncontroversial; neither does it need 
to be defended, nor is it necessary to employ rhetoric in order to convince others 
of its value. Its existence provides its evidence: fiat lux. This conviction is clearly 
witnessed by a quote from the prologue to the Brothers Grimm’s fairy tales: ‘Wir 
wollen in gleichem Sinne diese Märchen nicht rühmen oder gar gegen entgegengesetzte Mei-
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nung verteidigen: ihr bloßes Dasein reicht hier, sie zu schützen. Wer so mannigfach und 
immer wieder von neuem erfreut, bewegt und belehrt hat, trägt seine Notwendigkeit in sich 
und ist gewiss aus jener ewigen Quelle gekommen, die alles Leben betaut’ [By the same 
token, we do not intend to glorify these fairy tales, let alone defend them against 
opposed opinions: by their mere existence they are sufficiently protected. Things 
which time and again and in so many ways spread joy, move the heart of men and 
educate their minds have their own inherent necessity and surely spring from 
the same source that nourishes all life].52 In the case of the brothers Jacob and 
Wilhelm Grimm, such a certainty derived from evidential images.53 This is based 
on a highly speculative (and as we now have come to learn historically untenable) 
yet poetically fruitful supposition of ‘geheimer, verlorengegangener Berührungen der 
Märchen mit der eigenen mythischen Herkunft’ [arcane, long-lost points of contact 
between the fairy tales and one’s own mythological origin].54 The connection 
between the Brunhilde myth from the song of the Nibelungen and the tale of 
Sleeping Beauty lacks any historical basis whatsoever; nevertheless, the formi-
dable depiction of the slow awakening of man and nature is derived from natural 
philosophy. The quest for Romantic evidential images was a highly complex and 
artificial endeavour. It was marked by an elaborate interplay between writing and 
the oral tradition, as well as by an exhaustive use of inter-medial means to mo-
bilise the imagination. For example, the final image of the tale Rumpelstilzchen 
[Rumpelstiltskin] is an attempt to channel the affect of utter fury, the rage at 
the revelation of one’s identity into one cipher in a haptic, schematic manner: 
Besides itself with rage, Rumpelstiltskin stomps a deep hole into the ground, and 
standing with its legs spread far apart, it then tears itself in half by suddenly pull-
ing up its other leg. This evidential image is not part of the traditional lore, but 
rather the result of the style employed by the Brothers Grimm.
To summarise: Romantic popularity is constructed from the predominance of 
scholarly interest over interest in public opinion, from the witty evidence of an 
intellectual perspective, from a recipient ready to embrace new visions of the fu-
ture, a recipient who is aware of the dynamics of knowledge and of the histori-
cal change in communication horizons. The Romantic conception of popularity 
refuses any kind of intentional conveyance. Adam Müller states ‘und so ist Popu-
larität im echten Sinne nichts anderes als der notwendige, und ohne irgendeinen Vorsatz, 
aller wissenschaftlichen und künstlerischen Wirksamkeit innewohnende Geist der Bewe-
gung und des Fortschreitens’ [in its truest sense, popularity is therefore nothing else 
but the necessary, completely intent-free spirit of movement and progress which 
is inherent to all scholarly and artistic work]. The polemical tone targeting popu-
lar philosophers is hard to miss in this observation: ‘Bei dem misslingenden, hoch-
mütigen Herablassen der Autoren wird nichts begünstigt als gerade der flache Egoismus der 
Zeitgenossen, ihr Scheinleben und Scheinwissen. Deshalb habe alles Wissen eine persönliche 
Gestalt, ein unabhängiges Leben, Fleisch und Mark – es sei nur von Hause aus gemütlich, 
das heißt, kräftig, das heißt künstlerisch: und es wird von selbst schon wachsen und ergreifen 
und befruchten’ [With their failing, haughty condescension, the authors benefit 
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nothing but the shallow egotism of their contemporaries, their pseudo-lives and 
their pseudo-knowledge. That is why all knowledge ought to have a personal 
guise, a life of its own, flesh and bone – it only needs to be jovial in its nature, that 
is, strong, that is artistic: and it will grow and become captivating and fertilising 
all by itself ].55
Starting from here, the alternative to the conception of popularity of the 
Enlightenment becomes all too obvious – with its ‘tötenden Verallgemeinerung’56 
[destructive generalisation], i.e. with its erosion of the individual in the name 
of objectivity,57 its methodical tendency ‘alle einzelnen Bildungsarten abzuschleifen 
und auf den mittleren Durchschnitt zu bringen’58 [to level out all kinds of education 
to the medium average] – and by the same token, with its stylistic tendency to-
wards mediocrity, which is – to quote from a ‘moral weekly’ entitled Der Patriot: 
‘Weder für die Gelehrten zu schlecht und zu niedrig, noch für die Ungelehrten zu hoch 
und unbegreiflich, sondern jedermann verständlich’ [neither too worthless and low for 
scholars nor too sophisticated or unfathomable for non-scholars, but intelligible 
for everyone].59 
This article could be concluded at this point. In that case, however, we would 
pass up the opportunity to discuss the controversial and problematic nature of 
the Romantic concept of popularity as well as its new dogmatism. Hence, a short 
addendum. The habitual and socio-political centre of both alternative concep-
tions of popularity can be located by examining their respective stances on toler-
ance. In his seventh volume of Dichtung und Wahrheit [Poetry and truth], Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe translated the mediocrity of the popular philosophers, 
much-maligned by Romantics, to a neutral and non-pejorative perspective: Ac-
cording to him, the achievement of the popular philosophers was to support a 
‘besondere Mäßigkeit’ [particular moderation] by insisting on the middle course 
and on tolerance toward all opinions as the right way.60 As noted by Knigge in 
the last chapter of his Über den Umgang mit Menschen [On human relations], ‘Über 
das Verhältnis zwischen Schriftsteller und Leser’ [On the relationship between 
the author and the reader], this tolerance also included a certain composure and 
tolerance in terms of writing styles, as long as they did not veer toward the ‘Unsitt-
lichen’ [immoral], ‘Boshaften’ [malicious], ‘Schädlichen’ [harmful] and ‘Unsinnigen’ 
[nonsensical].61 The mercilessness, relentlessness, and acridity of Romanticism 
are aimed precisely at this random tolerance of popular philosophy which re-
fuses ‘streng zu scheiden’ [to strictly separate] ‘Gutes und Schlechtes’ [good from bad] 
be it in opinion or in style.62 Two quotes epitomise this attitude: ‘Das ist es eben, 
wovon man nicht wissen will in diesem artigen Zeitalter, wo der Mensch und die Tugend 
und alles in einen so glatten und geschmeidigen Conversationston gefallen sind, dass die 
Wahrheit selbst lieber unwahr und unhöflich sein darf’ [This is precisely what no-one 
cares about in this well-behaved age in which man and virtue and everything have 
been clad in such a smooth and elegant conversational tone that the truth itself 
may rather be untrue and impolite].63 This nearly fanatic acridity becomes all too 
obvious when Schlegel speaks ‘von der absoluten Entgegengesetztheit der Wege’ [of the 
diametric opposition of directions]: ‘Es giebt zwei ursprünglich verschiedene Tenden-






























zen im Menschen, die aufs Endliche und Unendliche, also nicht bloß eine Verschiedenheit des 
Grades, Nuancen von Tugend und Laster, sondern absolute Entgegengesetztheit der Wege, 
die es jedem Menschen freisteht zu wandeln’ [There are two basic, different tendencies 
in mankind – one towards the finite and the other towards the infinite – that 
is, not merely different in terms of the degree or the nuances of virtue and sin, 
but a diametric opposition of the directions everyone is free to take].64 It is only 
against this background that we can understand why Schlegel tends to transfer 
the Zoroastrian battle between ‘dem guten und bösen Prinzip’ [the good and the evil 
principle] as embodied in the figure of ‘Ahriman’ to the mediocrity of that era.65 
The dogmatic implications of this polemics should be obvious.
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